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Abstract—In this work we present a strategic network forma-
tion model predicting the emergence of multigroup structures.
Individuals decide to form or remove links based on the benefits
and costs those connections carry; we focus on bilateral consent
for link formation. An exogenous system specifies the frequency
of coordination issues arising among the groups. We are in-
terested in structures that arise to resolve coordination issues
and, specifically, structures in which groups are linked through
bridging, redundant, and co-membership interconnections. We
characterize the conditions under which certain structures are
stable and study their efficiency as well as the convergence of
formation dynamics.
Index Terms—strategic network formation, game theory, multi-
group connectivity models
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation and problem description
TO study the coordination and control features of a grouptask, the multiple groups performances must be fitted
together. An enduring postulate in organization science is that
coordination and control cannot be achieved strictly by the
authority structure, but must also entail informal communica-
tion and influence networks that link the members of different
task-oriented groups; we focus on formation of such network
structures. As the size of a connected social network increases,
multigroup formations that are distinguishable clusters of
individuals become a characteristic and important feature of
network topology. The connectivity of multigroup networks
may be based on edge bundles connecting multiple individuals
in two disjoint groups, bridges connecting two individuals in
two disjoint groups, or co-memberships. A large-scale network
may include instances of all of these connectivity modalities.
We set up populations of multiple groups and propose a
dynamic model for formation of these intergroup connectivity
structures.
Our economic dynamical model explains and predicts
whether a network evolves into different coordination and
control structures. Medium and large scale organizations adopt
these multigroup structures to tackle complex nested tasks.
Among the multitude of possible coordination and control
structures, we study formation of multigroup connectivity
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structures shown in Fig. 1, which are familiar constructs in
the field of social network science. For this purpose we apply
(a) Co-memberships (b) Edge Bundles (c) Bridges
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the three possible control and
coordination structures
a game-theoretic framework in which strategic agents take
actions based on the rate or importance of coordination prob-
lems. In other words, a value is assigned to the coordination
problem between any two distinct groups, so that all control
and coordination problems among groups are described by a
square non-negative matrix, as illustrated in Fig. 2. In our
setting, agents are myopic, self-interested, and have thorough
knowledge of graph topology and the utility they acquire from
any other agent.
B. Related literature
Bridge, edge bundle, and co-membership connectivity mod-
els have been studied extensively in [17], where implications
of these structures are investigated and generative models are
proposed for each. These prototypical structures can mitigate
coordination and control loss in an organization. Coordination
and control importance of bridge connected structure, in which
communication between subgroups are based on single contact
edges, is the emphasis of the [9], [22], and [21] models. Coor-
dination and control importance of the redundant ties structure,
in which multiple redundant contact edges connect pairs of
groups, is the emphasis of [8], Chapter 8, [7], and [23]. Co-
membership intersection structures, in which subgroups have
common members, is the emphasis of the linking-pin model
Fig. 2. F = frequency/importance of intergroup coordination problem
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2by Likert [14], as well as [6] and [2]. [25] and [24] propose
a community detection algorithm for overlapping networks.
Jackson and Wolinsky introduced a strategic network forma-
tion model in their seminal paper [12]. They studied pairwise
stability, where bilateral agreement is required for link forma-
tion. Homogeneity and common knowledge of current network
to all players are two assumptions in this model. Jackson
and Watts studied strategic network formation in a dynamic
framework in [11]. The network formation model we present
in this work is closely related to [12] and [11]. Jackson and
Rogers examined an economic model of network formation in
[10] where agents benefit from indirect relationships. They
showed that small-world features necessarily emerge for a
wide set of parameters.
In [1], Bala and Goyal proposed a dynamic model to study
Nash and strict Nash stability. In their model, starting from
any initial network, each player with some positive probability
plays a best response (or randomizes across them when there
is more than one); otherwise the player exhibits inertia. A
Markov chain on the state space of all networks is defined
whose absorbing states are strict Nash networks. The authors
proved that starting from any network, the dynamic process
converges to a strict Nash network (i.e., the empty network or
a center-sponsored star) with probability 1.
In [18], Olaizola and Valenciano extended the model in [1]
and studied network formation under linking constraints. An
exogenous link-constraining system specifies the admissible
links. Players in the same component of the link-constraining
network have common knowledge of that component. This
model collapses to the unrestricted setting in [1] (when the
underling constraining network is complete graph). The set of
Nash networks is a subset of Bala and Goyal’s unrestricted
Nash network sets.
In the network formation game by Chasparis and Shamma
in [5] and [4], agents form and sever unidirectional links with
other nodes, and stable networks are characterized through the
notion of Nash equilibrium. Pagan and Do¨rfler [19] studied
network formation on directed weighted graphs and considered
two notions of stability: Nash equilibrium to model purely
selfish actors, and pairwise-Nash stability which combines
the selfish attitude with the possibility of coordination among
agents. McBride dropped the common knowledge assumption
and studied the effects of limited perception (each player
perceives the current network only up to a certain distance) in
[16]. Song and van der Schaar [20] studied a dynamic network
formation model with incomplete information.
Community networks and their growth into potential so-
cially robust structures is studied in [15]. Bringmann et al.
analyzed the evolution of large networks to predict link
creation among the nodes in [3]. [13] studied link inference
problem in heterogeneous information networks by proposing
a knapsack-constrained inference method.
C. Statement of contribution
We consider a strategic network formation game described
by a cost of maintaining links, a benefit of having connections,
and an importance of coordination problems among pre-
specified groups. Our setup is a heterogeneous generalization
of the famous connection model. For this game, we study the
resulting multi-group structures that are pairwise stable and
socially efficient.
For this game, we also introduce a formation dynamics
whereby link formations require mutual consent and link
removals can be initiated unilaterally. We study the conditions
that give rise to formation of multigroup structures, as well
as conditions which cause the multigroup structures be stable
and/or efficient. Our contributions are as follows:
We introduce certain threshold functions and provide
bounds based on these functions to study pairwise stable and
efficient structures. We also investigate the convergence of
Formation Dynamics. For our analysis, we first focus on the
structure of each group and formation of intra-connections.
We particularly study the conditions which result in each
group being a clique, and present results on pairwise stability,
efficiency, and convergence of these cliques.
We then focus on the interconnections among those cliques.
We present results on the pairwise stability and convergence to
disjoint union of cliques for multigroup structures of arbitrary
sizes. The rest of the analysis for density of interconnections
is divided into two sections: two-group connectivity structures
and multigroup connectivity structures.
For the two group structures, we provide a complete char-
acterization of full ranges of parameters for stability and
efficiency. We present results on the pairwise stability and
efficiency of minimally connected, redundantly connected,
and maximally connected structures. We identify the ranges
of parameter in which the efficient and the pairwise stable
structure overlap and those in which they have a conflict.
We then investigate the multigroup structures. We study
the pairwise stability of minimally connected cliques along
arbitrary interconnection structures. We show that for the
special case of the interconnection being a star graph, it is
possible to identify the boundaries of parameters for stability
of all interconnections being minimally connected. We also
present results on formation of redundancies and for efficiency.
D. Preliminaries
Each undirected graph is identified with the pair (V, E). The
set of graph nodes V 6= ∅ represents individuals or groups of
individuals in a social network. |V| = n is the size of the
network. The pair (i, j) is called an edge and it indicates the
interaction between the two individuals i and j. The set of
graph edges E represents the social interactions or ties among
all individuals. Throughout this paper, since the individuals
are unchangeable, we refer to the network (V, E) simply as E .
The density of a graph is given by the ratio of the number of
its observed to possible edges, 2|E|
n(n− 1) . In a complete graph
every pair of distinct nodes is connected by an edge. We denote
the complete graph of size n by Kn. A clique is a subset of
vertices of a graph in which every two distinct vertices are
adjacent. We say two graphs are adjacent if they differ in
precisely one edge. A path of length k is a sequence of nodes
i1i2 . . . ik such that {(is, is+1)} ∈ E . A walk of minimum
length between two nodes is the shortest path. dij(E) denotes
3the distance between nodes i and j, which is defined as the
length of the shortest path beginning at i and ending at j.
II. MULTIGROUP NETWORK FORMATION MODEL
Consider a society of n individuals V , divided into m
groups. The set of m groups is denoted by {1, . . . ,m},m ≤ n.
P = {P1, . . . , Pm} represents the partitioning of individuals
into the groups and is a set partition of size n, i.e, V =
m⋃
γ=1
Pγ ,
and
m⋂
γ=1
Pγ = ∅. We use the shorthand notation sγ = |Pγ |
denoting the size of group γ. Throughout this paper, we
assume that sγ ≥ 3 for all γ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Group coordination importance matrix (data): is given as
F ∈ Rm×m, where 0 ≤ Fαβ ≤ 1 for α, β ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
represents importance/frequency of coordination problem be-
tween groups α and β. We assume F is a symmetric matrix
with diagonal entries equal to 1.
Individual coordination importance matrix: Fˆ ∈ Rn×n, is
obtained from F and the partition P , i.e., Fˆ = f(F, P ). We
construct Fˆ as follows:
Fˆij =
{
Fαβ , i ∈ Pα, j ∈ Pβ , i 6= j
0, i = j.
For the setting where groups are all of equal size s, one can
write
Fˆ = F ⊗ 1s1Ts − In
At edge set E , the payoff function for individual i ∈ V is
Ui(E) =
n∑
k=1
Fˆikδ
dik(E) −
∑
k∈Ni(E)
c, (1)
where dik(E) is the number of steps from individual i to k,
δ < 1 is the one-hop benefit, and c is the cost of each link. The
value of network E is defined as the sum of all individuals’
payoffs, i.e., v(E) = ∑ni=1 Ui(E), and it indicates the social
welfare. For a given society V and value function v, E∗ is an
efficient structure if its social welfare(value) is maximized over
all possible edge sets on V , i.e., E∗ = argmax
E
v(E). Given
the pair (i, j) in network E , we say that individual i benefits
from edge {(i, j)} if Ui
(E ∪ {(i, j)}) > Ui(E \ {(i, j)}).
Formation Dynamics: Time periods are represented with
countable infinite set N = {1, 2, . . . , t, . . . }. In each period,
a pair (i, j) is uniformly randomly selected and is added to,
or removed from, the network E according to the following
rules:
• if {(i, j)} /∈ E , then it is added when its addition is
marginally beneficial to the pair of individuals (i.e., either
both individuals benefit or one individual is indifferent
and the other benefits); the edge (i, j) is not added when
its addition causes a drop in the payoff of either or both
individuals or both individuals are indifferent towards it;
and
• if {(i, j)} ∈ E , then (i, j) is removed when its removal
benefits at least one of the two individuals; no action is
taken when both sides are either indifferent or benefit
from the existence of the edge.
Definition II.1. (Pairwise Stability) A network E is pairwise
stable if,
for all {(i, j)} ∈ E ,
Ui(E) ≥ Ui(E \ {(i, j)}) and Uj(E) ≥ Uj(E \ {(i, j)});
and for all {(i, j)} /∈ E ,
if Ui(E) < Ui(E ∪ {(i, j)}), then Uj(E) > Uj(E ∪ {(i, j)}).
Remark II.2. According to Definition II.1, if the edge (i, j)
belongs to the pairwise stable network, removing it results in
a loss for i or j; and if the edge (i, j) does not belong to
the pairwise stable network, adding it makes no difference or
causes loss for i or j.
Definition II.3. E ′ defeats E if either E ′ = E \ {(i, j)} and
Ui(E ′) > Ui(E), or E ′ = E ∪{(i, j)} and Ui(E ′) ≥ Ui(E) and
Uj(E ′) ≥ Uj(E) with at least one inequality holding strictly.
Lemma II.4. A network is pairwise stable if and only if it
does not change under Formation Dynamics.
Proof. To prove necessity, we refer to Remark II.2. According
to the definition, if a network is pairwise stable, no network
can defeat it, i.e., no links can be added to or severed from
it. To show sufficiency, note that a network not being changed
by Formation Dynamics, implies that:
(i) adding a link makes no difference or causes loss for at
least one individual;
(ii) removing a link results in loss for at least one individual.
Therefore, the network is pairwise stable.
According to Lemma II.4, if there exists some time t∗ such
that from t∗ on, no additional links are added to or severed
from a network by Formation Dynamics, then the network has
reached the pairwise stable structure.
We define the following terms that we will frequently use
throughout this paper indicating the density of the intercon-
nections among the groups.
Definition II.5. We say that a society of individuals consists of
the disjoint union of groups if there exists no interconnection
among any pairs of groups. For a connected pair, we say it is
(i) minimally connected if there exists exactly one intercon-
nection among the pair;
(ii) redundantly connected if there exist at least two intercon-
nections among the pair;
(iii) maximally connected if all of the possible interconnec-
tions among the pair of groups exist.
Fig. 3 represents a schematic illustration of the terms
discussed above.
Remark II.6. A minimally connected pair corresponds to
the bridge connection (Fig. 1c), redundantly connected to the
ridge connection (Fig. 1b), and maximally connected to a full
co-membership connection (Fig. 1a.)
We next define the Price of Anarchy (PoA) as a measure
of how the efficiency of a system degrades due to the selfish
behavior of its individuals. It is calculated as follows:
PoA =
maxE v(E)
minp.w.stableE v(E) .
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Fig. 3. Schematic illustration of interconnection densities
Throughout this paper we use the following threshold func-
tions y1(s, δ), y2(s, δ), and y3(δ) defined by
y1(s, δ) = δ +
(
s− 1)δ2,
y2(s, δ) = δ − δ2 +
(
s− 1)δ2 − (s− 1)δ3 = (1− δ)y1(s),
y3(δ) = δ − δ2.
In what follows we will often suppress the argument δ in the
interest of simplicity.
Under the conditions 0 < δ < 1 and s ≥ 3, we claim that,
0 < y3 < y2(s) < y1(s).
The proof is as follows: it is easy to see that y2(s) < y1(s).
To verify y3 < y2(s), we rewrite y2(s) as
(
δ− δ2)(1+ δ(s−
1)
)
= y3
(
1 + δ(s − 1)) > y3. Plots of these three threshold
functions for 0 < δ < 1, where s = 3 are depicted in Fig. 4. In
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0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
y1(3,  )
y2(3,  )
y3( )
 
Fig. 4. Plots of y1, y2, and y3 for s = 3.
what follows we provide bounds based on these functions to
study pairwise stable and efficient structures, and investigate
the convergence of the Formation Dynamics when possible.
III. RESULTS ON FORMATION OF DISJOINT CLIQUES
We first study the inner structure of each group in a pairwise
stable network. Throughout this paper, we assume that the
dynamics does not start with an initial state containing any
interconnection. We define the invariant set of all subgraphs
of disjoint cliques as S =
{ m⋃
γ=1
Eγ | Eγ ⊂ EKsγ } where Eγ
indicates the inner-network of group Pγ .
Theorem III.1 (Formation of Cliques: Pairwise Stability,
Efficiency, Convergence). Consider n individuals partitioned
into groups P1, . . . , Pm. Then, each one of these m groups is
a clique in the pairwise stable and in the efficient structure
if and only if c < y3. Moreover, starting from any state in
the invariant set S, each group Pα will form a sα-size clique
along Formation Dynamics (introduced in Section II).
Proof. We first provide the proof of sufficiency for pairwise
stability: for any individual i ∈ Pα, a direct link with
individual j, (j 6= i) from the same group provides a profit of
δ − c. Without a direct link, this profit is equal to δdij where
dij > 1 is the distance between i and j in E \ {(i, j)}. Since
δ − δ2 > c, we have δ − c > δ2 > · · · > δn; meaning that all
agents prefer direct links to any indirect link. Thus, if agents
i and j in group Pα are not directly connected, they will form
a link and each will gain at least (δ − c)− δdij > 0, i.e.,
for all {(i, j)} /∈ E , i, j ∈ Pα, i 6= j
Ui(E) < Ui(E ∪ {(i, j)}), and Uj(E) < Uj(E ∪ {(i, j)}).
Moreover, no node has an incentive to break any link since its
payoff strictly decreases if it do so, i.e.,
for all {(i, j)} ∈ E , i, j ∈ Pα, i 6= j,
Ui(E) > Ui(E \ {(i, j)}), and Uj(E) > Uj(E \ {(i, j)}).
Thus, each group forms a clique and no intra-connection is
removed after being formed, and according to Lemma II.4,
these m groups are cliques in the pairwise stable structure. To
prove necessity, assume we have a pairwise stable clique. For
Pα to remain a clique, all pairs of nodes belonging to the same
group should prefer to keep one-hop links rather than having
links with larger lengths, and thus δ − c > δ2 > δ3 > . . . .
This proves the claim that each group Pα is a clique if and
only if c < δ − δ2. Convergence of dynamics to cliques can
be obtained directly from the same argument.
We now continue by first proving that if c < δ − δ2, in the
efficient structure each group is a clique. From the analysis
above, when c < δ − δ2, we have:
v
(E ∪ {(i, j)})− v(E \ {(i, j)})
≥ Ui
(E ∪ {(i, j)})+ Uj(E ∪ {(i, j)})
− Ui
(E \ {(i, j)})− Uj(E \ {(i, j)})
≥ 2(δ − c− δ2) > 0
which holds for each pair (i, j) belonging to the same group,
meaning that each group is a clique in the efficient structure.
We next prove necessity for efficiency: assume E is the
efficient structure and each group is a clique, i.e., {(i, j)} ∈ E
for any two individuals i, j, (i 6= j) from the same group.
Then, we have:
v(E)− v(E \ {(i, j)})
= Ui(E) + Uj(E)− Ui(E \ {(i, j)})− Uj(E \ {(i, j)})
= 2(δ − c− δ2) > 0,
which results in c < y3.
Note: Theorem III.1 implies that formation of cliques re-
quires c < 1/4.
Theorem III.2 (Pairwise Stable Structures and Convergence:
Disjoint Union of Cliques). Consider n individuals partitioned
into groups P1, . . . , Pm of sizes s1, . . . , sm respectively. As-
sume that c < y3. Then, the unique pairwise stable structures
consists of disjoint union of cliques equal to the groups
P1, . . . , Pm if and only if Fαβ ≤ max
s∈{sα,sβ}
c
y1(s)
for all
α, β ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, α 6= β. Moreover, starting from any state
5in the invariant set S, Formation Dynamics (introduced in
Section II) converges to this pairwise stable structure.
Proof. We first prove sufficiency. Since no interconnection
exists in the invariant set S, for any network E ∈ S,
suppose two individuals i ∈ Pα and j ∈ Pβ are picked to
decide whether to add the corresponding interconnection or
not. We know that Ui(E ∪ {(i, j)}) ≤ Fαβy1(sβ) − c and
Uj(E ∪{(i, j)}) ≤ Fαβy1(sα)−c, where equalities hold when
both groups form cliques. Since Fαβ ≤ max
s∈{sα,sβ}
c
y1(s)
, at
least one of Ui
(E ∪ {(i, j)}) ≤ 0 and Ui(E ∪ {(i, j)}) ≤ 0
holds. Therefore, the interconnection {(i, j)} does not belong
to pairwise stable structure and it does not form. From
Theorem III.1, we know that unique stable state consists of
the disjoint union of cliques equal to the groups {1, . . . ,m}.
Suppose that all groups form cliques at a time t∗. From then
on, no link will be added or removed. According to Lemma
II.4, the pairwise stable structure consists of the disjoint union
of cliques equal to the groups {1, . . . ,m}, and the network
converges to this unique stable state.
To prove necessity, take any two individuals i ∈ Pα and j ∈
Pβ . Since {(i, j)} does not belong to pairwise stable structure,
we have at least one of Ui(E ∪ {(i, j)}) ≤ 0 and Ui(E ∪
{(i, j)}) ≤ 0 holds, and therefore, Fαβ ≤ max
s∈{sα,sβ}
c
y1(s)
.
IV. TWO GROUP CONNECTIVITY STRUCTURE
In this section we study pairwise stable and efficient struc-
tures when individuals are partitioned into two groups.
A. Pairwise Stability
In what follows we give the sufficient and necessary condi-
tion for pairwise stable structures.
Theorem IV.1 (Pairwise Stability and Convergence with Two
groups). Consider n individuals partitioned into groups P1, P2
of sizes s1 and s2 respectively. Then, under the assumption
c < y3, the network has
(i) a unique pairwise stable structure consisting of minimally
connected cliques if and only if
max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
≤ F12 < max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
;
(ii) a unique pairwise stable structure consisting of exact
k (2 ≤ k ≤ min{s1, s2}) interconnections if and only
if
max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)− (k − 2)δy3
< F12 < max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)− (k − 1)δy3 . (2)
(iii) a unique pairwise stable structure consisting of maxi-
mally connected cliques if and only if
c
y3
< F12 ≤ 1.
Moreover, starting from any state in the invariant set S, the
Formation Dynamics (introduced in Section II) converges to
the corresponding pairwise stable structure.
0 1
max
s2{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
max
s2{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
c
y3
Theorem III.2 Theorem IV.1 i) Theorem IV.1 ii) Theorem IV.1 iii)
F12
Fig. 5. An illustration of the four ranges of parameter space in
Theorems III.2 and IV.1.
Proof. From Theorem III.2, we know that at least one inter-
connection will be formed under Formation Dynamics if and
only if F12 ≥ max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
. Without loss of generality, sup-
pose that E contain two cliques and at least one interconnection
between them. Assume that agents i and j, respectively from
P1 and P2, are connected in E .
Take agents iˆ from P1 and jˆ from P2. For iˆ 6= i, jˆ = j, we
have Uiˆ(E ∪{(ˆi, j)}) = (s1−1)δ+F12δ+(s2−1)F12δ2−s1c
and Uiˆ(E \{(ˆi, j)}) = (s1−1)(δ−c)+F12δ2+(s2−1)F12δ3,
implying Uiˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, j)}) > Uiˆ(E \ {(ˆi, j)}) ⇐⇒ F12 >c
y2(s2)
. From Uj(E ∪ {(ˆi, j)}) = (s2 − 1)δ + 2F12δ +
(s2 − 2)F12δ2 + (s2 + 1)c and Uj(E \ {(ˆi, j)}) = (s2 −
1)δ + F12δ + (s2 − 1)F12δ2 + s2c, we obtain: Uj(E ∪
{(ˆi, j)}) > Uj(E \ {(ˆi, j)}) ⇐⇒ F12 > c
y3
. Then,
from y2(s) > y3 > 0, we conclude that an additional
interconnection {(ˆi, j)} is added and maintained if and only
if F12 >
c
y3
. Similarly, an additional interconnection {(i, jˆ)}
is added and maintained if and only if F12 >
c
y3
. For
iˆ 6= i, jˆ 6= j, using a similar argument, we obtain that
Uiˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, jˆ)}) > Uiˆ(E \ {(ˆi, jˆ)}) ⇐⇒ F12 >
c
y2(s2)
and
Ujˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, jˆ)}) > Ujˆ(E \ {(ˆi, jˆ)}) ⇐⇒ F12 >
c
y2(s1)
;
which means that an additional interconnection {(ˆi, jˆ)} is
added and maintained if and only if F12 > max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
(strictly holds when s1 = s2). Thus, we conclude that at
least two interconnections are added and maintained if and
only if F12 > min
{
c
y3
, max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
}
= max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
(strictly holds when s1 = s2.) Therefore, the network contains
precisely one interconnection if and only if max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
<
F12 < max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
. Moreover, from the moment when two
group form cliques and this unique interconnection builds,
the network will not change. According to Lemma II.4, this
concludes the proof of statement (i).
To prove (iii), assume that F12 > max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
. We have
shown above that E contains at least two interconnections
between two cliques. As a result, for any agent iˆ from P1 and
jˆ from P2, the distance between iˆ and jˆ in E \{(ˆi, jˆ)} is equal
to either 2 or 3. If it is equal to 2, then Uiˆ(E∪{(ˆi, jˆ)}−Uiˆ(E \
{(ˆi, jˆ)} = Ujˆ(E ∪{(ˆi, jˆ)}−Ujˆ(E \{(ˆi, jˆ)} = F12(δ−δ2)− c;
and if it is equal to 3, then Uiˆ(E ∪{(ˆi, jˆ)}−Uiˆ(E \{(ˆi, jˆ)} =
Ujˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, jˆ)} − Ujˆ(E \ {(ˆi, jˆ)} = F12(δ − δ3) − c. Inter-
6connection {(ˆi, jˆ)} is added and maintained if and only if
Uiˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, jˆ)} − Uiˆ(E \ {(ˆi, jˆ)} > 0 and Ujˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, jˆ)} −
Ujˆ(E \ {(ˆi, jˆ)} > 0. Thus, we conclude that {(ˆi, jˆ)} is added
and maintained if and only if F12 > max
{
c
δ − δ2 ,
c
δ − δ3
}
.
Since max
{
c
δ − δ2 ,
c
δ − δ3
}
=
c
δ − δ2 for 0 < δ < 1,
{(ˆi, jˆ)} is added and maintained maintained if and only if
F12 >
c
δ − δ2 =
c
y3
. Therefore, the network will not be
changed when all agents link with each other. By Lemma II.4,
this concludes the proof of (iii).
From statements (i) and (iii), we know that the pairwise
stable structure contains at least 2 but not fully numbers of
interconnections if max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
< F12 <
c
y3
. Suppose that
(i1, j1), . . . , (ik−1, jk−1) are k − 1 interconnections between
P1 and P2. Take agents iˆ from P1 and jˆ from P2. Similar to
the analysis in the proof of statement (i), we have the following
two cases:
(a) For iˆ /∈ {i1, . . . , ik−1}, jˆ /∈ {j1, . . . , jk−1}, we have
Uiˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, j)})− Uiˆ(E \ {(ˆi, j)})
= F12(y2(s2)− (k − 2)δy3), and
Ujˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, j)})− Uiˆ(E \ {(ˆi, j)})
= F12(y2(s1)− (k − 2)δy3),
implying
Uiˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, j)}) > Uiˆ(E \ {(ˆi, j)}), and
Ujˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, j)}) > Ujˆ(E \ {(ˆi, j)})
⇐⇒ F12 > max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)− (k − 2)δy3 .
(b) For iˆ ∈ {i1, . . . , ik−1}, jˆ /∈ {j1, . . . , jk−1} or iˆ /∈
{i1, . . . , ik−1}, jˆ ∈ {j1, . . . , jk−1}, we have
Uiˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, j)}) > Uiˆ(E \ {(ˆi, j)}) and
Ujˆ(E ∪ {(ˆi, j)}) > Ujˆ(E \ {(ˆi, j)})
⇐⇒ F12 > c
y3
.
Therefore, we conclude then k − th interconnection
is added and maintained if and only if F12 >
max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)− (k − 2)δy3 . Likewise, the (k + 1) − th
interconnection is added and maintained if and only if
F12 > max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)− (k − 1)δy3 . It follows that the unique
pair-wise stable structure has exact k (2 ≤ k ≤ min{s1, s2})
interconnections if and only if max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)− (k − 2)δy3 <
F12 < max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)− (k − 1)δy3 . This concludes the proof
of (ii).
Finally, we complete the proof of Theorem IV.1 by proving
the convergence statement. Since c < y3, from Theorem III.1
we know that the network structure, regardless of the density
of intra-group connections, consists of cliques of sizes s1 and
s2. From above analysis, starting from invariable set S, intra-
connections will increase one by one until one more intra-
connection can not bring increasing of benefit for two players.
Then, it follows from Lemma II.4 that the network can not be
changed from then on, i.e., the network will converge to the
corresponding pairwise stable structure under the formation
dynamics in Section II.
Theorem IV.1 implies that if F12 equals the boundaries, i.e.,
max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
, max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)− δy3 , maxs∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)− 2δy3 ,
. . . , max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y3
, the pairwise stable structure is not unique.
To show this, we provide the following example for a society
consisting of 8 individuals.
Example IV.2. Suppose that individuals are partitioned into
groups P1 = {1, 2, 3} and P2 = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. Let c = 0.2,
δ = 0.5 and F12 = max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
= 0.4. Assume at time
0, each of the two groups have a line structure, illustrated in
Fig 6. Now consider the following two processes:
Process A. At first, individuals 2 and 6 are chosen to play the
game and interconnection (2, 6) is formed. Then,
individuals 3 and 7 are chosen to play the game,
and interconnection (3, 7) is also formed. After
that, all possible intra-connections are considered
and formed. Finally, the network contains two
interconnections and reaches pairwise stability.
Process B. At first, all possible intra-connections are consid-
ered and formed. Then individuals 2 and 6 are
chosen to play the game and interconnection (2, 6)
is formed. As a result, the network contains only
1 interconnection and reaches pairwise stability.
Process A
Process B
Fig. 6. An illustration of two processes in Example IV.2. At each
step, the darker dots are chosen to play the game.
Fig. 5 illustrates the scenarios specified in Theorems III.2
and IV.1 for F12.
Remark IV.3. As the difference between group sizes |s2−s1|
increases, the bound for formation of bridges increases, and
thus communication between groups becomes harder. To see
why this is true, for a society of n = s1 + s2 individuals,
without loss of generality, we assume that s1 ≤ s2.. We know
max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
=
c
min
s∈{s1,s2}
y1(s)
=
c
y1(min{s1, s2}) , and
since max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
is a monotonically decreasing function
of s, as s1 increases, |s2 − s1|, and therefore, max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
decreases, and communication is facilitated. As illustrated in
Fig. 7, for a society of fixed size, as the sizes of the two groups
becomes closer to each other, the number of interconnections
increases.
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Fig. 7. Plots of no. of interconnections with fixed F12 = 0.25 and
n = 20 as a function of groups size s1, δ = 0.5, c = 0.2. Note that
s2 = n − s1, and thus the plot is symmetric about the line s1 = n2
and maximized at s1 = n2 .
B. Efficiency
We now study the efficiency of two group structure.
Theorem IV.4 (Efficiency with Two groups). Consider n
individuals partitioned into groups P1, P2 of sizes s1 and s2
respectively. Under the assumption that c < y3, the efficient
structure consists of:
(i) disjoint union of cliques if and only if
0 ≤ F12 ≤ cδ
y1(s1)y1(s2)
;
(ii) minimally connected cliques if and only if
cδ
y1(s1)y1(s2)
≤ F12 ≤ 2c
y2(s2) + y2(s1) + (s1 + s2 − 4)δy3 ;
(iii) redundantly connected cliques if and only if
2c
y2(s2) + y2(s1) + (s1 + s2 − 4)δy3 ≤ F12 ≤
c
y3
;
(iv) maximally connected cliques if and only if
c
y3
≤ F12 ≤ 1.
Proof. From Theorem III.1, we know that addition of an intra-
connection results in increasing the payoff of both individuals
involved in that link, as well as the social welfare, and removal
of any intra-connection causes loss for both individuals and
decreases social welfare. As a result, the efficient structure
consists of two cliques. Suppose i ∈ P1 and j ∈ P2. Let
E0 = EKs1
⋃ EKs2 be the union of two cliques of sizes s1 and
s2. We have
Uk(E0∪{(i, j)})− Uk(E0)
=

F12
(
δ + (s2 − 1)δ2
)− c, k = i;
F12
(
δ + (s1 − 1)δ2
)− c, k = j;
F12
(
δ2 + (s2 − 1)δ3
)
, k ∈ P1, k 6= i;
F12
(
δ2 + (s1 − 1)δ3
)
, k ∈ P2, k 6= j.
(3)
It follows that
v
(
(E0∪{(i, j)}
)−v(E0) = 2F12[δ+(s1−1)δ2+(s2−1)δ2
+ (s1 − 1)(s2 − 1)δ3]− 2c.
E0 is the efficient structure if and only if v
(
(E0 ∪ {(i, j)}
)−
v(E0) ≤ 0, which is equivalent to:
F12 ≤ c
δ + (s1 − 1)δ2 + (s2 − 1)δ2 + (s1 − 1)(s2 − 1)δ3
=
cδ
y1(s1)y1(s2)
.
This concludes the proof of (i).
Now let E1 = E0
⋃{(i, j)}. As elaborated above, v(E1) −
v(E0) ≥ 0 if and only if
F12 ≥ c
δ + (s1 − 1)δ2 + (s2 − 1)δ2 + (s1 − 1)(s2 − 1)δ3
=
cδ
y1(s1)y1(s2)
.
Suppose iˆ ∈ P1 and jˆ ∈ P2. For the case of iˆ 6= i and jˆ 6= j,
we have
Uk(E1 ∪ {(ˆi, jˆ)})− Uk(E1) =

F12y2(s2)− c, k = iˆ
F12y2(s1)− c, k = jˆ
0, k = i, j
F12(δ
2 − δ3), otherwise.
For the case of iˆ = i and jˆ 6= j, we have
Uk(E1∪{(i, jˆ)})− Uk(E1)
=

F12(δ − δ2)− c, k = i,
F12y2(s1)− c, k = jˆ,
0, k ∈ P2 and k 6= jˆ,
F12(δ
2 − δ3), k ∈ P1 and k 6= i.
For the case of iˆ 6= i and jˆ = j, we have
Uk(E1∪{(ˆi, j)})− Uk(E1)
=

F12(δ − δ2)− c, k = j,
F12y2(s2)− c, k = iˆ,
0, k ∈ P1 and k 6= iˆ,
F12(δ
2 − δ3), k ∈ P2 and k 6= j.
It follows that
v(E1 ∪ {(ˆi, jˆ)})− v(E1)
=

F12[y2(s2) + y2(s1) + (s1 + s2 − 4)(δ2 − δ3)]− 2c,
jˆ 6= j, iˆ 6= i,
2F12y2(s1)− 2c, iˆ = i, jˆ 6= j,
2F12y2(s2)− 2c, iˆ 6= i, jˆ = j.
Since y2(s) is a monotonically increasing function of s and
2c
y2(s2) + y2(s1) + (s1 + s2 − 4)(δ2 − δ3)
=
c
y2(s1) + (s2 − 2)(δ2 − δ3)
=
c
y2(s2) + (s1 − 2)(δ2 − δ3) ,
8we have
2c
y2(s2) + y2(s1) + (s1 + s2 − 4)(δ2 − δ3)
< min
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
.
We then conclude that v(E2∪{(ˆi, jˆ)})−v(E2) ≤ 0 if and only
if F12 ≤ 2c
y2(s2) + y2(s1) + (s1 + s2 − 4)δy3 . Statement (ii)
follows accordingly.
Assume F12 ≥ max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
. From statement (ii), we
know that the efficient structure has at least two interconnec-
tions. For any agent iˆ from P1 and jˆ from P2, as elaborated
in the proof of Theorem IV.1, one has
v(E ∪ {(ˆi, jˆ)} − v(E \ {(ˆi, jˆ)} ≥ 2[F12(δ − δ2)− c],
which concludes statements (iii) and (iv).
From the properties of y1(s), y2(s), and y3, we have:
(i) if δ ≥ max
s∈{s1,s2}
s− 3
n− 3 , then
cδ
y1(s1)y1(s2)
< max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
≤ 2c
y2(s2) + y2(s1) + (s1 + s2 − 4)δy3
< max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
;
(ii) if δ < max
s∈{s1,s2}
s− 3
n− 3 , then
cδ
y1(s1)y1(s2)
<
2c
y2(s2) + y2(s1) + (s1 + s2 − 4)δy3
< max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
< max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
.
From Theorems IV.1 and IV.4, we can directly obtain the
conditions for the equivalence between pairwise stability and
efficiency.
Corollary IV.5. Consider n individuals partitioned into
groups, P1 and P2 of sizes s1 and s2 respectively. Under the
assumption c < y3, the efficient structure has equal or more
interconnections than the pairwise stable structure. Moreover,
the efficient structure is the pairwise stable structure if
(i) for δ ≥ max
s∈{s1,s2}
s− 3
n− 3 ,
F12 ∈
[
0,
cδ
y1(s1)y1(s2)
]
⋃[
max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
,
2c
y2(s2) + y2(s1) + (s1 + s2 − 4)δy3
]
⋃[ c
y3
, 1
]
, or
(ii) for δ < max
s∈{s1,s2}
s− 3
n− 3 ,
F12 ∈
[
0,
cδ
y1(s1)y1(s2)
]⋃[ c
y3
, 1
]
,
We illustrate the compatibility (and incompatibility) be-
tween the pairwise stable and efficient structures in Fig. 8.
The intersections of efficient and pairwise stable structures
are highlighted.
Corollary IV.6. Consider n individuals partitioned into
groups P1 and P2 of sizes s1 and s2, respectively. Under the
assumption c < y3, if the efficient structure is not pairwise
stable, then the efficient structure has more interconnections
than the pairwise stable structure.
Proof. If the efficient structure is not pairwise stable, it implies
that it can be changed by Formation Dynamics. Suppose that it
has less interconnections than pairwise stable structure. Then,
adding interconnections can make it pairwise stable, which
means that both players involved in the interconnection benefit
from this interconnection. Then the social welfare increases
which is conflict with the fact that the structure is efficient.
Thus, the efficient structure has more interconnections than
the pairwise stable structure.
Remark IV.7. For the two intervals
cδ
y1(s1)y1(s2)
< F12 <
max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
and
2c
y2(s2) + y2(s1) + (s1 + s2 − 4)δy3 <
F12 < max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
, the pairwise stable structure is not
efficient. For max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y2(s)
≥ F12 < c
y3
, the pairwise stable
structure might be not efficient. This is because individuals
are rational and selfish (i.e., they only care about their own
payoffs.) Therefore, total social utility might drop when an
individual tries to maximize its own payoff. Specifically,
(i) when
cδ
y1(s1)y1(s2)
< F12 < max
s∈{s1,s2}
c
y1(s)
, an in-
dividual experiences loss by having an interconnection,
although that interconnection could bring profit for other
individuals and, therefore, result in an increase of total
utility. The individual refuses to add or maintain this
interconnection.
(ii) when
2c
y2(s2) + y2(s1) + (s1 + s2 − 4)δy3 < F12 <
c
y3
,
as mentioned in the proof of Theorem IV.4, there exists
at least one interconnection {(i, j)}, i ∈ P1, j ∈ P2. For
the two individuals iˆ ∈ P1 and jˆ ∈ P2 (ˆi 6= i, jˆ 6= j), an
interconnection causes loss for the player from the larger
group, but brings profit for all other individuals, which
results in removal of the interconnection or rejection in
adding it and, therefore, in total utility loss.
Fig. 9 shows the number of interconnections and social
welfare for both efficient and stable structures for two cliques
of sizes 3 and 5, where the value of δ = 0.5 and c = 0.2.
Note that:
(i) As shown in Fig. 9a, when F12 =
c
y3
which evaluates
to 0.8 for the choice of our parameters, there exist
non unique pairwise stable and efficient structures, and
the number of interconnections for those structures vary
between 3 and 15.
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Fig. 8. An illustration of the ranges of parameter space in Theorems IV.1 and IV.4. The intervals indicated above the horizontal line refer
to bounds of pairwise stability and those below the horizontal line refer to bounds of efficiency.
(ii) As shown in Fig. 9a and Fig. 9b, for F12 ∈ (0.67, 0.2)∪
(0.23, 0.53), the pairwise stable structure is not efficient
and thus the social welfare of efficient structures is always
greater than that of pairwise stable structures. Fig. 10
shows plot of PoA as a function of F12. We observe
that the slope for F12 ∈ (0.67, 0.2) is the highest. This
is because in this interval, the pairwise stable structure
dose not have any interconnection, whereas the efficient
structure has one interconnection. This link brings large
value for the overall network and makes a large difference
in social welfare of two kinds of structures.
We next discuss the evolution of intra vs. interconnections
according to Formation Dynamics, when starting from an
empty graph.
Remark IV.8 (Formation of intra- vs. interconnections). Start-
ing from an empty (or sparse) graph, initially the speed of
formation of intra-connections is generally higher than that
of interconnections. Fig. 11 illustrates the fact that at the
beginning of the formation dynamics, a certain amount of
intra-connections is required to produce enough incentives for
both groups to communicate through an interconnection.
V. MULTIGROUP CONNECTIVITY STRUCTURE
In what follows we analyze the more general case of having
more than two groups. Consider n individuals partitioned into
groups P1, . . . , Pm, and the payoff function defined above with
1-benefit δ < 1 and edge cost c, and functions y1, y2, and
y3. From Theorem III.1 we know that each group forms a
clique when y3 > c. We introduce the undirected graph T =
(VP , ET ), whose nodes represent groups and (α, β) ∈ ET if
there exists at least one connection between Pα and Pβ .
Theorem V.1 (Sufficiency Condition for Minimally Connected
Cliques). Consider n individuals partitioned into groups
P1, . . . , Pm of sizes s1, . . . , sm respectively. Assume that c <
y3 and T is connected. Then, there exists a pairwise stable
structure consisting of minimally connected cliques along T ,
if
(i) for all (α, β) ∈ ET , α, β ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
m∑
λ6=α,λ=1
Fαλ(δ
d′αλ − δdαλ)(1 + (sλ − 1)δ) > c,
m∑
λ 6=β,λ=1
Fβλ(δ
d′βλ − δdβλ)(1 + (sλ − 1)δ) > c,
Fαβ < max
s∈{sα,sβ}
c
y2(s)
; and
(4)
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Fig. 9. Plots of no. of interconnections and social welfare as a
function of F12 for two groups of sizes 3 and 5, δ = 0.5, c = 0.2.
0 .2 0.4 0.8 1
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
Po
A
.23 0.53.067
F12
Fig. 10. Plot of price of anarchy as a function of F12 for two groups
of sizes 3 and 5, δ = 0.5, c = 0.2.
(ii) for all (α, β) /∈ ET , α, β ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
m∑
λ 6=α,λ=1
Fαλ(δ
d′αλ − δdαλ)(1 + (sλ − 1)δ) < c,
or
m∑
λ6=β,λ=1
Fβλ(δ
d′βλ − δdβλ)(1 + (sλ − 1)δ) < c,
(5)
where d′µλ = dµλ(ET ∪ {(α, β)}) and dµλ = dµλ(ET \
{(α, β)}).
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Fig. 11. Time evolution of the number of inter- and intra-connections
for two cliques of size 7.
Proof. Suppose the network E0 (consisting of disjoint cliques)
be connected along T and satisfy
(i) if (α, β) ∈ ET , there is only one inter-link between Pα
and Pβ ;
(ii) for every group Pα, only one agent iα has inter-links.
For any pair of (α, β), let E ′′ = E0 ∪ {(iα, iβ)} and E ′ =
E0 \ {(iα, iβ)}. it is easy to find that
Ui(E ′′)− Ui(E ′) =
m∑
k=1,k 6=α
Fkα
∑
l∈Pk
(δdil(E
′′) − δdil(E′))− c.
Therefore, we have
Uiα(E ′′)−Uiα(E ′) =
m∑
λ 6=α,λ=1
Fαλ(δ
d′αλ−δdαλ)(1+(sλ−1)δ)−c
and
Uiβ (E ′′)−Uiα(E ′) =
m∑
λ6=β,λ=1
Fβλ(δ
d′βλ−δdβλ)(1+(sλ−1)δ)−c.
Therefore, for (α, β) ∈ ET , it follows from (4) that E ′′
defeats E ′. Similar to the proof of Theorem IV.1, since
Fαβ < maxs∈{sα,sβ}
c
y2(s)
, there only exists one inter-link
between Pα and Pβ . For (α, β) /∈ ET , (5) implies that there
exist no inter-link between Pα and Pβ .
By Theorem II.4, since network E0 can not be changed un-
der dynamics, we can conclude that network E0 is stable.
Remark V.2. Theorem V.1 answers the question: given a
certain matrix F and graph structure E is E pairwise stable
or not?
Corollary V.3. For the special case of interconnection struc-
ture being a star, with Pγ as the central group, the sufficient
condition of Theorem V.1 can be simplified as follows:
(i) for all α ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (α 6= γ)
Fαγ > max
s∈{sα,sγ}
c
y1(s)
; and
(ii) for all (α, β) ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (α, β 6= γ),
Fαβ < max
s∈{sα,sβ}
c
y2(s)
.
In the following example, we illustrate that due to random-
ness in choosing the pair of players, Formation Dynamic does
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not always converge to a unique stable structure even for the
same initial network structure and matrix F .
Example V.4. Consider the case where we have
c
y1(s)
<
Fαβ <
c
y2(s)
for all α, β, and that δ <
√
5− 1
2
. We have five
equal size groups named {1, 2, . . . , 5}. Two different processes
are shown in Fig. 12.
Process A. For the process shown in Fig. 12a the order of
pair selection is as follows: (1, 2) → (1, 3) →
(1, 4) → (1, 4) → (1, 5). Note that by (1, 2) we
mean an individual selected from group 1 paired
with an individual from group 2, which results
in the star graph being the convergent pairwise
stable structure.
Process B. Now, consider the process shown in Fig. 12b for
which the order of pairs of groups selected is as
follows: (2, 3) → (1, 2) → (1, 3) → (1, 4) →
(3, 5)→ (2, 4)→ (4, 5). At the very last step, we
have:
Ui
(E ∪ {4, 5} − Ui(E \ {4, 5}))
=F45
(
y1(s)
)− F45(δ3y1(s))
+ F35
(
δy1(s)
)− F35(δ2y1(s))− c.
Since F35, F45 <
c
y1(s)
and δ <
√
5− 1
2
, we
conclude that
F45(1− δ3) + F35(δ − δ2) > c
y1(s)
.
Consequently, we obtain
Ui
(E ∪ {4, 5} − Ui(E \ {4, 5})) > 0
which means that the connection (4,5) is formed.
Now since we have Fαβ <
c
y2(s)
, no connected
triad and thereby, no additional links will be
formed. Also no link will be removed. Therefore,
the final structure in Fig. 12b, which is a ring, is
stable.
Example V.4 shows that, based on the order of the sequence
of selected pairs, we can have two or possibly more convergent
stable structures, and therefore, the convergence results cannot
be generalized and the convergent structure is not always
unique.
From Theorem III.1 we know that each group forms a
clique. We now analyze the interconnections among those
cliques. Theorem V.5 addresses the redundancy of intercon-
nections.
Theorem V.5 (Formation of Redundancies). Consider n
individuals partitioned into groups P1, . . . , Pm of sizes
s1, s2, . . . sm. Suppose that c < y3. Then, under Formation
Dynamics,
(i) redundant interconnections between Pα and Pβ will be
formed and never removed, if Fαβ > max
s∈{sα,sβ}
c
y2(s)
,
and
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Fig. 12. The processes of Example V.4. At each step, shaded nodes
represent the groups which the selected individuals belong to, and
the outcome of the game (action taken regarding link addition, link
removal, or indifference) is represented in the next.
(ii) maximal interconnections between Pα and Pβ will be
formed and never removed, if
c
y3
< Fαβ ≤ 1.
Fig. 13 illustrates the four scenarios for Fαβ’s. The hor-
izontal axis corresponds to the values of Fαβ where {αβ}
belongs to the edge-set of the spanning tree, and the vertical
axis corresponds to all other Fαβ’s.
0 1max
s2{s↵,s }
c
y2(s)
c
y3
F↵ 
Fig. 13. An illustration of ranges of parameter space in Theorem V.5
Theorem V.6. (Efficiency) For n individuals partitioned into
groups according to P , the efficient structure requires the same
node to be chosen from each clique to provide bridges to other
cliques, i.e., for a fixed interconnection structure and number
of nodes, choosing the same representative from each clique
increases the social welfare.
Proof. Suppose that the density and the structure of intercon-
nections are fixed. It is easy to see that by choosing the same
representative from each clique, the distance between individu-
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Fig. 14. Three groups of sizes 3, 4, and 5, δ = 0.5, c = 0.2
als from different cliques would be shortened, resulting in the
term δdij in equations (1) being larger. Therefore, the social
welfare will increase.
However, this structure is unlikely to be pairwise stable
since the representative would bear a high cost for maintaining
these interconnections. Figure 15 illustrates two networks with
the same interconnection structureswhere one network has
higher social welfare due to each group having only one
representative.
(a) (b)
Fig. 15. In network a) each cliques has only one representative,
whereas in figure b) some cliques have multiple representatives.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes the first strategic network formation
model that, given a matrix specifying the frequency of a
coordination problem among groups, identifies the conditions
that result in multigroup formation. The model deviates from
the seminal papers on strategic network formation in that it
accounts for heterogeneous frequency of control problems aris-
ing among the individuals and investigates pairwise stability
and efficiency of multigroup connectivity structures, as well
as convergence of the formation dynamics.
In our model link formations occur bilaterally and thus
many of the classical game-theoretic concepts do not apply to
our framework. In particular, to study equilibrium structures,
we utilize the concept of pairwise stability. A key challenge
in our problem stems from the fact that not many tools are
available for rigorous analysis or that they cannot be applied
to the case of heterogeneous coordination problems among
groups.
We identified the ranges of parameters where pairwise stable
and efficient structures do and do not coincide and concluded
that, for two-group structures, the efficient structures always
has the same or a larger number of links than the pairwise
stable ones. We also considered the price of anarchy and
observed that the highest value occurs for the case when
pairwise stable structures consist of disjoint union of cliques
and the efficient structure has one link. Similar to the classical
models, at the two ends of the spectrum of link values there
is an overlap between efficient and stable structures.
We presented the conditions that result in the formation dy-
namics starting from an invariant set converge to cliques, and
provided rigorous results for the number of interconnections
in two-group structures. However, exact identification of the
boundaries that result in certain number of interconnections
among arbitrary number of groups with arbitrary size and
interconnection structure is out of scope of this paper.
We note that by providing a full characterization of pairwise
stability and efficiency for a two-group model, we focus on
local topologies versus global topologies, as the individual
interconnections can capture valuable information about the
whole network and that all interconnections have subsets of
two groups. This can be interpreted into taking the distance
only for the people in one’s group or in the next immediate
group in the utility function.
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